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Amazon Air 767 Crew Warned Of Excessive Speed Before Miami Runway Overrun, NTSB Reveals

Aviation Today News Desk September 10, 2026

Miami, United States: One of the pilots of Amazon Prime Air Flight 7598 repeatedly warned that the Boeing 767 was travelling

AAIB Flags Non-Negative Pilot Test And Loss Of All Three Hydraulics In Air India Probe

Aviation Today News Desk September 4, 2026

New Delhi, India: The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has raised a serious safety concern after its preliminary investigation into the

TSB Finds Flat Light, Whiteout And Spatial Disorientation Behind Fatal Helicopter Crash

Aviation Today News Desk August 30, 2026

Alberta, Canada: The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has concluded that a fatal Bell 206L helicopter crash near Fort Chipewyan,

South Korean Police Refer 7 Officials To Prosecutors Over Jeju Air Crash Localizer Claims

Aviation Today News Desk August 27, 2026

South Korean police have referred seven Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport officials to prosecutors over allegations that they knowingly prepared

NSIB Preliminary Report Finds Safety Gaps In Enugu Air Benin Airport Runway Overrun

Aviation Today News Desk August 25, 2026

Benin City, Nigeria: The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) has identified several safety gaps at Benin’s Oba Akenzua II Airport following

Fochville, South Africa: The preliminary accident report, released on 28 July 2026 by the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), found that the engine of a Bird Aviation Piper PA-28-180 registered ZS-ESZ was not producing power when the aircraft struck the ground near Fochville, Gauteng, on 27 June 2026. The report remains preliminary, with the investigation still ongoing and the AIID cautioning that its findings do not apportion blame or liability. According to the report, the operator was Bird Aviation, while the aircraft was being used under a hire-and-fly arrangement for hour-building. The operation was classified as Training under Part 91, and the aircraft belonged to the approved training organisation (ATO) from which it was hired. The accident involved two people, a 21-year-old Indian pilot and one passenger. Both were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot held a valid Private Pilot Licence (PPL) and was building flight hours toward a Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) through the ATO. The flight took place on the afternoon of 27 June 2026, when the pilot and passenger departed Lanseria International Airport (FALA) in Gauteng on an hour-building flight, intending to return to the same airport. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and in accordance with Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations. The flight had initially been planned for 0900Z, but departure was delayed because of persistent haze and low visibility. After conditions improved, the aircraft departed Runway 07 at 1325Z, as confirmed by an air traffic control officer at Lanseria. It then flew toward the Johannesburg General Flying Area (GFA), Flight Area Dangerous 182 (FAD 182). Multiple eyewitnesses later reported seeing the aircraft flying unusually low and performing unfamiliar manoeuvres. The aircraft subsequently flipped and began spinning to the left before impacting the ground. The crash occurred on a farm at Elandsfontein, south-east of Fochville, Gauteng, at coordinates 26° 35' 27.30" South, 27° 33' 41.24" East, with a field elevation of 5,124 feet. The accident was recorded at 1415Z. The pilot was a 21-year-old Indian national with a valid PPL. His licence was initially issued by the regulator on 25 May 2026 and was valid until 30 April 2027. His Class 2 aviation medical certificate was issued on 26 March 2025 and was valid until 31 March 2030. The report states that the aircraft type was endorsed on his licence and that he had no previous accidents recorded in relation to the investigation. The pilot had accumulated 132.2 total flight hours, including 19.4 hours in the previous seven days and 55.1 hours in the previous 90 days. He had flown 43.8 hours on the aircraft during the previous 90 days and had accumulated 122.7 hours on the Piper PA-28-180. The aircraft was a 1977-built Piper PA-28-180, a four-seat, single-engine, all-metal, low-wing aircraft with fixed tricycle landing gear. It was powered by a four-cylinder, naturally aspirated 180-horsepower Lycoming O-360-series engine. Its serial number was 28-3303, and it had accumulated 3,242.6 airframe hours by the time of the accident. The AIID found that the aircraft had valid registration and airworthiness documentation. Its current Certificate of Registration had been issued on 19 September 2025, while its latest Certificate of Airworthiness was valid until 31 October 2026. The aircraft underwent its mandatory periodic inspection on 13 March 2026 at 3,218.4 airframe hours, after which a Certificate of Release to Service was issued, valid until 12 March 2027 or 3,318.4 total airframe hours, whichever came first. The aircraft was maintained by an approved aircraft maintenance organisation whose certificate was valid until 30 June 2026. The organisation held Category A and Category C ratings for the aircraft's airframe and engine. The ATO's certificate had been renewed on 17 November 2025 and was valid until 28 February 2029. Fuel records showed that 111 litres of Avgas 100LL had been uplifted after the aircraft's flight on 26 June 2026, with the pilot refuelling the tanks before parking the aircraft. The Piper PA-28-180 has a fuel capacity of 189 litres, providing approximately six hours of endurance. The preliminary findings state that the aircraft departed Lanseria with full fuel tanks and no technical issues. However, fuel was found leaking from the aircraft after the accident. The report does not currently identify the fuel leak as the cause of the engine power loss. Weather conditions were favourable and were not considered a contributing factor. The 1400Z METAR from Lanseria recorded winds from 300° at 7 knots, CAVOK visibility, a temperature of 16°C, scattered clouds at 4,500 feet, a dew point of 5°C and QNH of 1026 hPa. The aircraft's navigation and communication equipment had no recorded defects before the flight. It was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and the report states that neither was required for this aircraft type. The wreckage examination showed that the aircraft hit the ground in a steep nose-down attitude at high speed with little forward momentum. The debris was concentrated around the impact point, with a crater being the only ground scar identified. The aircraft came to rest facing south-east. Investigators found that the ailerons could not be moved and were both in the down position, while the elevator and rudder moved freely. The landing gear had broken and collapsed rearwards. Both wings suffered severe leading-edge damage and accordion-like deformation that ruptured the fuel tanks. The damage was consistent with heavy compressive loading during the steep, rapid-impact sequence. The top engine cowling had separated from the aircraft and was found approximately 10 metres ahead of the main wreckage. The engine cradle was deformed and the engine was facing slightly to the right. The propeller showed asymmetric damage, with one blade bent rearwards and the other showing little or no deformation. Neither blade displayed S-curve bending. The AIID said the damage pattern was consistent with the propeller being non-rotating at impact. This evidence, together with eyewitness accounts of the pilot apparently attempting to restart the engine, led investigators to conclude that the engine was not producing power at the time of impact. However, the preliminary report does not yet establish the underlying reason for the loss of engine power. The instrument panel was broken into multiple pieces, with several indicators dislodged from their original positions. The report does not provide a final interpretation of the instrument evidence at this stage. There was no evidence of a pre- or post-impact fire. Investigators considered the accident not survivable because of the extent of cockpit damage. Emergency responders reported that the pilot-in-command was not wearing his seat belt and was consequently thrown from the aircraft. Medical and pathological information is reserved for the final report. The aircraft was operating in the Johannesburg GFA within FAD 182, outside the Terminal Control Area. FAD 182 extends from the ground to Flight Level 100, or 10,000 feet, except where it intersects the TMA. Bird Aviation also used the Safely Track Me application to monitor flights. The system relied on the pilot's mobile-phone GPS signal. Tracking was active when ZS-ESZ departed Lanseria, but shortly after the aircraft exited the Johannesburg Special Rules Area West TMA, the phone stopped transmitting its GPS position and the aircraft could no longer be tracked through the application. The AIID's preliminary findings confirm that the pilot was qualified and medically fit for the flight, the aircraft was being used under a valid hire-and-fly arrangement for hour-building, the operator/ATO held a valid certificate, the aircraft had valid registration and airworthiness documentation, and its maintenance records were up to date. The investigation therefore establishes several key facts but has not yet determined the precise cause of the accident. The aircraft left Lanseria with full fuel and no known technical issues; the engine was not producing power at impact; weather was not a factor; and the aircraft entered a steep, high-speed descent before striking the ground. The AIID is continuing to examine other aspects of the accident that could have safety implications. No safety recommendations have been issued at this stage. The AIID said these will be addressed in the final report. The investigation was classified as a Category 1 accident. The AIID appointed an investigator-in-charge and a co-investigator, dispatched investigators to the site and notified the relevant states and organisations under South African regulations and ICAO Annex 13. The AIID will lead the investigation and issue the final report. The AIID has warned that the preliminary report is based on evidence gathered during an ongoing investigation and that information may change if additional evidence emerges. Accordingly, the current finding should be described as the engine not producing power at impact, rather than stating that investigators have already determined the cause of the engine power loss.

SACAA Preliminary Findings Show No Engine Power At Impact In Fatal South Africa Crash

Aviation Today News Desk August 15, 2026

Fochville, South Africa: The preliminary accident report, released on 28 July 2026 by the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) of

Muan, South Korea: South Korean police on August 11 raided the state-run Korea Airports Corporation (KAC), the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Busan Regional Office of Aviation as investigators widened their probe into the Jeju Air crash at Muan International Airport that killed 179 people in December 2024. The searches were carried out by a special police investigation team seeking additional evidence over suspected professional negligence resulting in death or injury and possible failures by government agencies and other bodies responsible for airport safety and operations. Police said the investigation is examining both the cause of the December 29, 2024 crash and whether relevant authorities properly performed their duties. A police official said 45 people are currently facing suspicions of professional negligence resulting in death or injury, while investigators are also considering whether charges linked to causing a serious public disaster could be applied. The latest searches targeted KAC, which operates most of South Korea’s major airports except Incheon International Airport, along with the Transport Ministry and the Busan Regional Office of Aviation. The action marks another major phase in a criminal investigation that has continued for more than a year as investigators examine decisions surrounding Muan Airport’s construction, safety oversight, airport infrastructure and the response to the crash. The crash involved Jeju Air Flight 7C2216, a Boeing 737-800 operating from Bangkok to Muan. The aircraft was carrying 181 people when it attempted an emergency landing at Muan International Airport on December 29, 2024. After a bird-strike-related emergency, the aircraft landed without its landing gear deployed, slid along the runway and struck a concrete structure supporting a localizer antenna before breaking apart and catching fire. Only two crew members survived, while 179 passengers and crew members were killed. The criminal investigation has increasingly expanded beyond the aircraft itself to possible institutional and infrastructure failures. Police have been examining events dating back to the construction of Muan Airport in 1999 to determine whether decisions made during the airport’s development created conditions that contributed to the disaster. In February 2026, the special investigation team raided the Busan Regional Office of Aviation and a company involved in construction at Muan Airport, seeking evidence connected to possible contributing factors. At that stage, police had booked 45 people on suspicion of occupational negligence and were examining whether the Serious Accidents Punishment Act’s provisions concerning a serious public disaster could apply. The investigation was further expanded in March, when police raided the Transport Ministry to obtain additional material concerning the crash and the conduct of government agencies. Investigators specifically examined whether officials responsible for aviation navigation and airport operations had properly carried out their duties. Police said the probe was looking for factors dating back to the beginning of Muan Airport’s construction. A major development came in March 2026 when South Korea’s Board of Audit and Inspection identified serious shortcomings in the approval and management of airport safety infrastructure. The state auditor found that the Transport Ministry had approved 14 non-compliant localizer installations at eight airports, including Muan, and that some installations had been certified as meeting frangibility requirements despite not doing so. The audit identified 30 cases of wrongdoing or procedural failure, including shortcomings in bird-strike prevention and aviation safety management. At Muan, investigators found that a 2.4-metre-high concrete embankment supporting the localizer had been built partly to reduce construction costs because the terrain around the runway and Runway End Safety Area was sloped. The Board of Audit and Inspection said the structure had been approved by the Transport Ministry in 2003 without an adequate vulnerability assessment. Korea Airports Corporation later requested a review of the structure in 2007, but no changes were made. The structure was subsequently reinforced during a modernization project between 2019 and 2024. International aviation standards call for localizer installations in areas exposed to aircraft impact to be designed so that they can break apart rather than present a rigid obstacle. The state audit found that the ministry had continued to certify such installations and approve inspections that incorrectly indicated compliance for periods extending as long as 22 years. The Transport Ministry said it “humbly accepted” the audit findings and said it would take strict follow-up measures, including improvements to localizer structures and stronger bird-strike prevention. Korea Airports Corporation also said it was implementing improvements recommended in the audit. The infrastructure findings have become particularly significant because a separate government-commissioned simulation examined what might have happened had the concrete embankment not been present at the end of the runway. The simulation, cited in January 2026 reporting, suggested the outcome could have been substantially different without the rigid structure. The findings intensified scrutiny of how the localizer installation was designed and approved. The criminal probe is also unfolding alongside a renewed examination of the accident investigation itself. In May 2026, President Lee Jae Myung visited Muan International Airport after additional human remains were discovered during renewed recovery operations more than a year after the crash. He called for a thorough reinvestigation and criticised shortcomings in the original recovery process. “Given the size and condition (of the additional remains), they should not have been overlooked,” Lee said, adding that “the lax handling of the scene was clearly a problem.” He also instructed officials to consider using outside experts for the reinvestigation. The renewed investigation followed concerns that the original recovery operation had not fully recovered victims’ remains and that officials lacked adequate procedures and oversight. The discovery of additional remains prompted the government to revisit not only the recovery process but also the wider handling of the disaster. The technical investigation into the crash had earlier established evidence of a bird strike. A preliminary accident report released in January 2025 found feathers and blood stains in both engines of the Boeing 737-800. DNA testing identified the remains as Baikal teals, migratory ducks that winter in South Korea. The report, however, did not establish that the bird strike alone caused the crash. It also noted that the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder stopped recording about four minutes before impact, leaving critical portions of the final sequence unavailable. The preliminary investigation said authorities would conduct further examinations of the engines, recorders, air traffic control data, bird-strike evidence and the localizer structure. Subsequent reporting in July 2025 cited a source familiar with the investigation as saying there was “clear evidence” that the pilots shut down the less-damaged engine after the bird strike. However, that finding was part of the continuing technical investigation and was disputed by victims’ families, who questioned aspects of the investigation and its transparency. The crash therefore remains under examination on several fronts: the bird strike and resulting aircraft systems problems, the sequence of cockpit decisions, the loss of recorder data, the runway and airport infrastructure, the approval and maintenance of the localizer structure, bird-strike prevention, regulatory oversight and the actions of government agencies before and after the accident. The August 11 raids represent the latest step in the separate criminal investigation into potential responsibility and negligence. Police are now seeking additional records from the organisations responsible for airport operation, aviation oversight and infrastructure, while considering whether the conduct of officials and other responsible parties could amount to professional negligence or a serious public disaster offence. The full accident investigation has yet to provide a final public account resolving all outstanding questions surrounding the crash. The latest police action, coming after the state audit findings and the government's renewed examination of the crash site, places greater focus on whether failures in airport design, regulatory approval, safety oversight or emergency response contributed to the scale of the tragedy.

Jeju Air Crash Probe Widens As South Korean Police Raid KAC, Transport Ministry

Aviation Today News Desk August 11, 2026

Muan, South Korea: South Korean police on August 11 raided the state-run Korea Airports Corporation (KAC), the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure

Brazil Formally Accuses 16 Voepass Employees Over 2024 ATR Crash That Killed 62

Aviation Today News Desk August 7, 2026

Vinhedo, Brazil: Brazilian federal police have formally accused 16 current and former Voepass employees over the August 2024 crash of an

New Mexico, United States: The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has revealed that a U.S. military GPS jamming exercise was underway when a Beechcraft C90 King Air air ambulance crashed into mountainous terrain near Lincoln, New Mexico, killing all four people on board. The findings were released in a preliminary report, meaning investigators have not yet determined the probable cause or contributing factors of the accident. The accident occurred at 0015 local time on May 14, 2026, after the aircraft, registered N249CP and operated by Generations Jets under Part 135 as an air ambulance flight, departed Roswell Air Center (ROW) to Sierra Blanca Regional Airport (SRR) in Ruidoso to pick up a patient for transport to Albuquerque. The flight was crewed by two pilots and carried two flight nurses employed by Trans Aero Medical Services. The crash claimed the lives of Captain Keelan Clark, First Officer Ali Kawsara, and flight nurses Sarah Clark and Jamie Novick. According to the NTSB, GPS jamming activities conducted by the U.S. military were active over the accident area during the flight. Shortly after departure, the aircraft was cleared to 12,000 feet under instrument flight rules (IFR). At 0000:26, air traffic controllers advised the crew that the aircraft had climbed to 13,000 feet, 1,000 feet above its assigned altitude. The pilot responded that the aircraft had lost GPS capability and requested headings from air traffic control. The crew initially requested the RNAV (GPS) Runway 24 approach into Sierra Blanca Regional Airport but, after losing GPS navigation, switched to the ILS Runway 24 approach. At 0001:17, the Albuquerque Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller contacted the operations supervisor and requested that the military stop the GPS jamming. The aircraft continued north while controllers provided radar headings. During the same period, three other aircraft also reported GPS outages, with one crew requiring additional assistance to identify a ground-based navigation aid. At about 0005, the ARTCC operations supervisor again contacted the military to stop the jamming, after which ADS-B transmissions returned to normal. At 0008, the accident crew reported having Ruidoso in sight and requested to continue visually. Controllers cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and advised the crew they could cancel IFR after descending below 9,000 feet or after landing. The pilots acknowledged the clearance and stated they would cancel IFR "in just a couple of minutes." No further radio transmissions were received. The aircraft then turned southwest toward Sierra Blanca Regional Airport. Between the airport and the aircraft lay the Capitan Mountains, which rise to 10,201 feet. Around 0010, after being informed the aircraft was on a visual approach, the military resumed the GPS jamming exercise. The King Air began descending before briefly climbing again. The final Spidertracks data point recorded the aircraft at 9,823 feet, 150 knots ground speed, and a heading of 250 degrees. Seconds later, it struck terrain at an elevation of about 9,950 feet, approximately 730 feet east and 230 feet below the Capitan Mountains Summit Radio Facility, triggering a post-impact fire that ignited a forest fire. Investigators also found that the crew's ForeFlight weather briefing included active NOTAMs warning that military GPS jamming would affect GPS, WAAS, GBAS and ADS-B navigation over a wide area encompassing the accident flight path and altitudes. Additional NOTAMs advised that Sierra Blanca Regional Airport's automated weather observation system (AWOS) was out of service, while the weather briefing indicated no METAR or TAF was available for the destination airport. The airport's published RNAV and ILS Runway 24 approach procedures also state that the procedures are not authorized when the local altimeter setting is unavailable. The NTSB emphasized that the report is preliminary and subject to change, and that it does not determine the accident's probable cause.

Military GPS Jamming Was Underway During Fatal Air Ambulance Flight, NTSB Says

Aviation Today News Desk August 6, 2026

New Mexico, United States: The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has revealed that a U.S. military GPS jamming exercise was

Alaska, United States: The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its final investigation report into the fatal crash of Bering Air Flight 445, concluding that degraded pilot situational awareness, inadequate airspeed management, operation above the aircraft's maximum allowable weight, shortcomings in Bering Air's safety management, and insufficient Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight combined to cause the accident. The report also identified deficiencies in weather forecasting for supercooled large droplet (SLD) icing and issued new and reiterated safety recommendations aimed at improving commuter airline safety. The accident occurred on February 6, 2025, at about 3:20 p.m. Alaska Standard Time when a Textron Aviation Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX, registration N321BA, operating as Bering Air Flight 445, crashed onto pack ice in Norton Sound while approaching Nome Airport, Alaska. The Part 135 scheduled commuter flight had departed Unalakleet Airport on the final leg of a three-flight rotation carrying one pilot and nine passengers. All ten occupants were killed. According to the NTSB, the pilot and dispatcher reviewed weather conditions before departure, with forecasts indicating instrument flight conditions, light snow and occasional moderate icing. However, no official weather products warned of the severe supercooled large droplet icing conditions the flight would later encounter. Air traffic control advised the pilot that both runways had been temporarily closed for snow and ice removal and suggested slowing the aircraft to avoid arriving before they reopened. The pilot reduced engine power, causing the aircraft's airspeed to decrease. Around the same time, the aircraft entered moderate-to-severe icing conditions containing supercooled large droplets. Flight data showed the aircraft's airspeed continued to fall despite increased engine power. At about 3:19 p.m., the Low Airspeed Awareness (LAA) system activated and automatically disengaged the autopilot after airspeed dropped below approximately 99 knots. Within seconds, the aircraft's speed fell further, its pitch increased, and it entered an aerodynamic stall before rapidly descending. Air traffic control instructed the pilot to climb after observing the aircraft's low altitude and later issued a low-altitude alert, but no response was received. The aircraft impacted pack ice about 12 miles offshore of Norton Sound and approximately 32 miles east of Nome. Because the aircraft was not required to carry a cockpit voice recorder or flight data recorder, investigators reconstructed the accident using Garmin G1000 avionics data, ADS-B tracking, air traffic control communications and examination of the wreckage. The evidence enabled investigators to establish the sequence of events leading to the fatal loss of control, forming the basis of the NTSB's final findings and safety recommendations. In its final report, the NTSB concluded that the aircraft experienced an aerodynamic stall after the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while operating in icing conditions. Investigators found that following the automatic disengagement of the autopilot, the pilot did not effectively monitor the aircraft's rapidly decreasing airspeed or increasing angle of attack, resulting in a loss of control from which recovery was not possible. The investigation determined that the aircraft encountered supercooled large droplet (SLD) icing, a hazardous condition beyond the certification limits of the Cessna 208 B's TKS ice protection system. Although post-accident examinations found no evidence of any pre-impact mechanical failure and confirmed the TKS system functioned as designed, the icing conditions exceeded those for which the aircraft was certificated. The NTSB also identified operational shortcomings at Bering Air. Investigators found the aircraft departed above the maximum allowable gross take-off weight for flight into known or forecast icing conditions. The report stated that the operator had routinely used an increased maximum take-off weight permitted under a supplemental type certificate, even though the aircraft's flight manual prohibited that higher weight in icing conditions. The Board further concluded that Bering Air's safety management system failed to adequately identify and mitigate operational risks, while internal weight-and-balance practices and oversight were insufficient. The investigation also criticised the FAA's oversight of the operator, concluding that inspectors failed to identify or correct Bering Air's use of improper weight limitations during operations in icing conditions. Additionally, the Board found shortcomings in Alaska's aviation weather products, noting that available forecasts did not adequately communicate the potential for supercooled large droplet icing despite meteorological conditions supporting its development. As part of its final report, the NTSB issued multiple safety recommendations to the FAA, National Weather Service and Bering Air. These include strengthening oversight of Part 135 operators, improving compliance with aircraft weight limitations, enhancing pilot training for operations in severe icing, expanding weather products that identify supercooled large droplet icing in Alaska, and improving operational risk management to help prevent similar accidents.

NTSB Final Report Cites Pilot Error, Icing And FAA Failures In Fatal Bering Air Crash

Aviation Today News Desk July 31, 2026

Alaska, United States: The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its final investigation report into the fatal crash of

Investigation

Amazon Air 767 Crew Warned Of Excessive Speed Before Miami Runway Overrun, NTSB Reveals

AAIB Flags Non-Negative Pilot Test And Loss Of All Three Hydraulics In Air India Probe

TSB Finds Flat Light, Whiteout And Spatial Disorientation Behind Fatal Helicopter Crash

South Korean Police Refer 7 Officials To Prosecutors Over Jeju Air Crash Localizer Claims

NSIB Preliminary Report Finds Safety Gaps In Enugu Air Benin Airport Runway Overrun

SACAA Preliminary Findings Show No Engine Power At Impact In Fatal South Africa Crash

Jeju Air Crash Probe Widens As South Korean Police Raid KAC, Transport Ministry

Brazil Formally Accuses 16 Voepass Employees Over 2024 ATR Crash That Killed 62

Military GPS Jamming Was Underway During Fatal Air Ambulance Flight, NTSB Says

NTSB Final Report Cites Pilot Error, Icing And FAA Failures In Fatal Bering Air Crash

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