Kanpur, India: The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has found that Garg Aviation did not comply with prescribed flight-data monitoring requirements for flying training organisations (FTOs) following the fatal crash of its Tecnam P2006T aircraft VT-NBV in Kanpur.
The finding was made in the preliminary report released on 28 September 2026, meaning the investigation is still ongoing and the document does not establish the final cause of the accident. AAIB has recommended that the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) ensure Garg Aviation and other FTOs strictly follow flight-data monitoring requirements and issue specific procedures for such monitoring.
According to the seven-page preliminary report, Garg Aviation told investigators that it carried out random monitoring of Garmin flight data. However, AAIB found that no records of the monitoring were maintained, while the operator had no standard operating procedure (SOP) defining how the monitoring was to be conducted or what flight-data exceedance limits were to be considered. AAIB said the deficiency warranted an interim safety recommendation to DGCA. The bureau recommended that DGCA issue specific guidelines for flight-data monitoring and make the procedure part of the FTO’s Training and Procedures Manual (TPM).
AAIB has not linked the monitoring deficiency to the cause of the crash. Investigators have downloaded data from the Garmin data card recovered from the wreckage and are analysing it. Both engines have also been retrieved and quarantined for detailed examination, with the investigation team coordinating with the aircraft manufacturer. Italy’s ANSV and the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have appointed accredited representatives, while a Tecnam technical adviser is also participating in the investigation.
The accident occurred on 27 August 2026, when Garg Aviation’s Tecnam P2006T, registration VT-NBV, was conducting a training flight from Kanpur Civil Aerodrome. The aircraft was operating in the local flying area and had two people on board a trainee pilot and an instructor.
AAIB’s preliminary report states that VT-NBV took off at approximately 11:11 am. At around 11:25 am, the aircraft made a radio-telephony call reporting “Ops Normal” and said it would make another call after 10 minutes. No further communication was received from the aircraft.
AAIB stated, “No further call was received from VT-NBV thereafter.” The temporary radio controller attempted to contact the aircraft but received no response. Other aircraft also attempted to establish communication without success.
At about 12:10 pm, Garg Aviation received information that the aircraft had force-landed in the Ganga Barrage area, around 4.85 nautical miles northwest of Kanpur Civil Aerodrome. According to information provided to investigators by police officials, local residents reported the crash through the emergency helpline 112.
Police and ambulance personnel reached the site and transported the two occupants to a nearby hospital in Kanpur, where both were declared dead. AAIB said no distress call was made by the aircraft before the accident. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact, but AAIB reported no fire following the crash.
The two occupants were identified in contemporaneous reporting as flight instructor Sachin Bhatia and trainee pilot Abhishek Pujari.
Bhatia was reported to be an experienced instructor, while Pujari was undergoing flight training with Garg Aviation. Both were killed in the accident. The Ministry of Civil Aviation said shortly after the crash, “The aircraft was on a training flight in the Local Flying Area of Kanpur Civil Airport. There were two persons on board, a trainee pilot and an instructor. Both sustained fatal injuries in the accident.” The ministry also said, “The circumstances and cause of the accident will be determined through the investigation.”
That statement remains important because the latest AAIB document is still only a preliminary report and does not identify a confirmed technical, operational or human cause.
Investigators have recovered and secured the Garmin data card from the aircraft. The recorded information has been downloaded and is being analysed as part of the continuing investigation.
AAIB has also retrieved both engines and quarantined them for detailed examination. The investigation team is coordinating with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) as part of that work.
The investigation also involves international representatives. Italy’s Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV) and the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have each appointed an accredited representative. A technical adviser from Tecnam is also participating.
AAIB has sought additional records and documents relating to the aircraft and operating crew from DGCA.
At this stage, the preliminary report does not establish that the crash was caused by engine failure, mechanical failure, maintenance problems, pilot error, weather, loss of control or the flight-data-monitoring deficiency. Those questions remain part of the continuing investigation.
The latest finding concerns the way Garg Aviation monitored flight data from its training aircraft. AAIB examined the operator’s compliance with Flying Training Circular (FTC) 01 of 2022, which covers monitoring of training at FTOs.
The operator told investigators that it conducted random monitoring of Garmin data. However, AAIB found that there were no records showing that such monitoring had been conducted. Investigators also found no SOP explaining the monitoring process and no defined exceedance limits against which the recorded flight data could be assessed. AAIB therefore recommended interim action by DGCA.
The bureau said DGCA should direct Garg Aviation and other FTOs to strictly comply with the applicable Flight Data Monitoring requirements. It also recommended that DGCA establish specific procedures for flight-data monitoring and incorporate them into the FTO’s Training and Procedures Manual. The finding is a regulatory and safety-monitoring issue identified during the accident investigation, but AAIB has not stated that it caused the fatal crash.
The investigation into VT-NBV is continuing, with investigators examining the Garmin flight data, engines, aircraft records, crew information and other evidence before reaching conclusions.
The 28 September 2026 document is a preliminary report, not a final report. AAIB has therefore not yet determined the precise sequence of events that caused VT-NBV to crash or identified a confirmed cause.
